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A Framework for Decision Fusion in Image
Forensics based on Dempster-Shafer Theory of
Evidence
Marco Fontani, Student Member, IEEE, Tiziano Bianchi, Member, IEEE, Alessia De Rosa,
Alessandro Piva, Senior Member, IEEE, and Mauro Barni, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In this work we present a decision fusion strategy for
image forensics. We define a framework that exploits information
provided by available forensic tools to yield a global judgment
about the authenticity of an image. Sources of information are
modeled and fused using Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence,
since this theory allows to handle uncertain answers from tools
and lack of knowledge about prior probabilities better than the
classical Bayesian approach. The proposed framework permits
to exploit any available information about tools reliability and
about the compatibility between the traces the forensic tools
look for. The framework is easily extendable: new tools can
be added incrementally with a little effort. Comparison with
logical disjunction- and SVM- based fusion approaches shows an
improvement in classification accuracy, particularly when strong
generalization capabilities are needed.
Index Terms—Image Forensics, Image Tampering, Image In-
tegrity, Decision Fusion, Dempster Shafer, Forgery Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Images have always played a key role in the transmission
of information, mainly because of their presumed objectivity.
However, in the last years the advent of digital imaging has
given a great impulse to image manipulation, and nowadays
images are facing a thrust crisis. Image Forensics, whose goal
is to investigate the history of an image using passive (blind)
approaches, has emerged as a possible way to solve the above
crisis.
The basic idea underlying Image Forensics is that most, if
not all, image processing tools leave some (usually impercepti-
ble) traces into the processed image, and hence the presence of
these traces can be investigated in order to understand whether
the image has undergone some kind of processing or not. In
the last years many algorithms for detecting different kinds
of traces have been proposed (see [1] for an overview) which
usually extract a set of features from the image and use them to
classify the content as exposing the trace or not. Very often, the
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creation of a forgery involves the application of more than a
single processing tool, thus leaving a number of traces that can
be used to detect the presence of tampering; this consideration
suggests to analyze the authenticity of images by using more
than one tamper detection tool. Furthermore, existing forensic
tools are far from ideal and often give uncertain or even wrong
answers, so, whenever possible, it may be wise to employ
more than one tool searching for the same trace. On top of
that, it may also be the case that the presence of one trace
inherently implies the absence of another, because the traces
are mutually exclusive by definition. For these reasons, taking
a final decision about the authenticity of an image relying
on the output of a set of forensic tools is not a trivial task,
thus justifying the design of proper decision fusion methods
explicitly thought for this scenario. Given that new forensic
tools are developed continuously, we would like our decision
fusion method to be easily extendable, so that new tools can be
included as soon as they become available. Another key issue
regards the creation of training datasets for the fusion stage:
while producing datasets for training single tools is a rather
simple task, creating datasets representing the variety of pos-
sible combinations of traces that could be introduced during
the creation of a realistic forgery is extremely challenging.
As an answer to the above needs, we propose a decision
fusion framework for the image forensics scenario based on
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence (DST); the proposed
model is easily extendable and, as a key contribution, allows
incremental addition of knowledge when new tools become
available. With respect to more classical approaches to in-
ference reasoning, the use of DST avoids the necessity of
assigning prior probabilities (that would be extremely diffi-
cult to estimate) and also provides more intuitive tools for
managing the uncertain knowledge provided by the forensic
tools. This paper extends a previous work by Fontani et al. [2]
both from a theoretical and an experimental points of view.
The most significant novelty is that tools and searched traces
are modeled in a more flexible way, specifically, a mechanism
for hierarchical fusion of traces is introduced, leading to a
key improvement of framework extendability. Moreover, the
number of implemented tools has been raised to five and tests
have been performed also over a realistic (hand-made) forgery
dataset. Differences with respect to the previous work will be
highlighted when necessary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
subsection (I-A), we briefly introduce the problem of decision
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fusion in an image forensics scenario, then we give some basic
notion of DST (section II) and describe in detail the proposed
framework (section III). In section IV, we present experimental
results regarding a scenario in which the outputs of five
image forensic tools ([3], [4], [5], [6] and [7]) are fused to
give a global judgement about image authenticity. The results
show a clear performance improvement with respect to more
classical decision fusion strategies when realistic forgeries are
examined.
A. Decision fusion in the image forensics scenario
The problem of taking a final decision about an hypothesis
by looking at the output of several different tools is an
important task in decision fusion; there are basically three
kinds of approaches to tackle with it. The first is to perform
fusion at the feature level: a subset of the features extracted
by the tools is selected and used to train a global classifier.
The second is to consider the (usually scalar) output provided
by the tools and fuse them (fusion at the measurement, or
score, level). The last approach consists in fusing the binary
answers of the tools, usually obtained by binarizing their soft
outputs (fusion at the abstract level). An effective example of
how these three strategies can be applied to a problem similar
to the one addressed in this paper is illustrated in [8], where
fusion is used cast in a steganalysis framework. In fact, both
in steganalysis and image forensics, tools usually extract some
features from the image, perform measurements/classification
on them and finally produce an output, often probabilistic,
which can be thresholded to yield a binary classification.
Although being promising in terms of performance, fusion
at the feature level has some serious drawbacks, most impor-
tantly the difficulty of handling cases involving a large number
of features (commonly addressed as “curse of dimensionality”)
and the difficulty to define a general approach to feature
selection, since ad-hoc solutions are needed for different cases.
Furthermore, feature selection in most cases is followed by
some machine learning, that by definition is effective only
when a training dataset can be prepared that is representative
of a large part of the global population of samples. If this can
be done for training a single detector, creating a representative
dataset of all possible image forgeries is practically unfeasible,
especially in the case of photorealistic ones.
Working at the other extreme, the abstract level, suffers from
the complementary problem: lots of information is discarded
when outputs are thresholded, so the discrimination power of
the various tools is not fully exploited. In image forensics,
most of the existing works are based on the first approach [9]
[10] [11]; an hybrid solution has been investigated in [12], but
still focusing on feature fusion.
In order to get around the above problems, we choose to
perform fusion at the measurement level. This choice delegates
the responsibility of selecting features and training classifiers
(or other decision methods) to each single tool, thus keeping
the fusion framework more general and easy to extend, while
avoiding the loss of important information about tool response
confidences. Specifically, we present a fusion framework based
on Dempster-Shafer’s “Theory of evidence” (DST) [13] that
focuses exclusively on fusion at the measurement level. The
proposed framework exploits knowledge about reliability of
tools and about compatibility between different traces of
tampering, and can be easily extended when new tools become
available. It allows both a “soft” and a binary (tampered/non-
tampered) interpretation of the fusion result, and can help
in analyzing images for which taking a decision is critical
due to conflicting data. Note that a fusion approach involving
DS Theory has already been proposed in [14], but such a
scheme applies fusion at the feature level hence inheriting
the general drawbacks of feature-level fusion, noticeably the
lack of scalability and the need to retrain the whole system
each time a new tool is added. Also, in [15] the authors
exploit Dempster’s combination rule, which provides only a
limited part of the expressive capability of the DST framework,
to devise an image steganalysis scheme that combines three
algorithms to improve detection accuracy; however, our goal
is deeply different from that pursued in [15], since we do not
aim at providing a specific multi-clue forgery detection tool,
but at defining a theoretical model that allows fusing a generic
set of tools targeting splicing detection. As we will see later
in the paper, the combination rule by itself is not sufficient to
address our problem, since we must deal with heterogeneous
and evolving sources of information.
II. DEMPSTER-SHAFER’S THEORY OF EVIDENCE
Dempster-Shafer’s theory of evidence was firstly introduced
by A. Dempster [16] and further developed by G. Shafer [13].
It can be regarded as an extension of the classical Bayesian
theory that allows representation of ignorance and of available
information in a more flexible way. When using classical
probability theory for defining the probability of a certain
event A, the additivity rule must be satisfied; so by saying
that Pr(A) = pA one implicitly says that Pr( A) = 1   pA,
thus committing the probability of an event A to that of
its complementary A. Most importantly, the additivity rule
influences also the representation of ignorance: complete ig-
norance about a dichotomic event A in Bayesian theory is
best represented by setting Pr(A) = Pr( A) = 0:5 (according
to the maximum entropy principle), but this probability dis-
tribution also models perfect knowledge about the probability
of each event being 0.5 (as for a coin tossing), thus making
it difficult to distinguish between ignorance and perfectly
known equiprobable events. Since reasoning in a Bayesian
framework makes an extensive use of prior probabilities,
which are often unknown, a wide usage of maximum entropy
assignments is often unavoidable, leading to the introduction
of extraneous assumptions. To avoid that, DS theory abandons
the classical probability frame and allows to reason without
a-priori probabilities through a new formalism.
A. Shafer’s formalism
Let the frame  = fx1; x2; : : : ; xng define a finite set of
possible values of a variable X; a proposition about variable
X is any subset of . We are interested in quantifying how
much we are confident in propositions of the form “the true
value of X is in H”, where H   (notice that the set of all
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possible propositions is the power set of , 2). To give an
example, let us think of a patient that can either be affected by
cancer or not: we can model this scenario defining a variable C
with frame  = fac; ncg where ac is the proposition “patient
is affected by cancer”, nc is the proposition “patient is not
affected by cancer”, and (ac[ nc) is the doubtful proposition
“patient is or is not affected by cancer”. The link between
propositions and subsets of  allows to map logical operations
on propositions into operations among sets. Each proposition
is mapped onto a single subset and is assigned a basic belief
mass through a Basic Belief Assignment, defined over the
frame of the variable.
Definition 1: Let  be a frame. A function m : 2 !
[0; 1] is called a Basic Belief Assignment (BBA) over the
frame  if:
m(;) = 0;
X
A22
m(A) = 1 (1)
where the summation is taken over every possible subset A of
.
Continuing the previous example, a doctor after examining
the patient could provide information that lead us to write the
following basic belief assignment:
m(X) =
8><>:
0:8 for X = facg
0:2 for X = fncg
0 for X = fac [ ncg
(2)
Each set S such that m(S) > 0 is called a focal element
for m. In the following, we will omit the frame when it is
clear from the context, writing m instead of m; furthermore,
when writing mass assignments only focal elements will be
listed (so the last row of eq. (2) would not appear). BBAs are
the atomic information in DST, much like probability of single
events in probability theory. By definition, m(A) is the part of
belief that supports exactly A but, due to lack of knowledge,
does not support any strict subset of A, otherwise the mass
would “move” into the subsets. In the previous example, if
we had assigned mass 0.85 to proposition fac[ncg and 0.15
to facg it would have meant that there is some evidence for
the patient being affected by cancer but, basing on current
knowledge, a great part of our confidence cannot be assigned
to none of the two specific propositions. Whenever we have
enough information to assign all of the mass to singletons1,
DST collapses to probability theory.
Intuitively, if we want to obtain the total belief for a set A,
we must add the mass of all proper subsets of A plus the mass
of A itself, thus obtaining the Belief for the proposition A.
Definition 2: Given the BBA in 1, the Belief function Bel :
2 ! [0; 1] is defined as follows:
Bel(A) =
X
BA
m(B)
Bel(A) summarizes all our reasons to believe in A with the
available knowledge. There are many relationships between
m(A), Bel(A) and other functions derived from these; here
we just highlight that Bel(A) + Bel( A)  1 8A   and
1A singleton is a set with exactly one element.
1   (Bel(A) + Bel( A)) is the lack of information (or the
amount of doubt) about A.
B. Combination Rule
If we have two BBAs defined over the same frame, which
have been obtained from two independent sources of informa-
tion, we can use Dempster’s combination rule to merge them
into a single one. Notice that the concept of independence
between sources in DST is not rigorously defined (as it is, for
example, in Bayesian theory): the intuition is that we require
that the different pieces of evidence have been determined by
different (independent) means [17].
Definition 3: Let Bel1 and Bel2 be belief functions over
the same frame  with BBAs m1 and m2. Let us also assume
that K, defined below, is positive. Then for all non-empty
X   the function m12 defined as:
m12(X) =
1
1 K 
X
A;B:
A\B=X
m1(A)m2(B) (3)
where K =
P
A;B:A\B=;m1(A)m2(B), is a BBA function
defined over  and is called the orthogonal sum of Bel1 and
Bel2, denoted by Bel1 Bel2.
K is a measure of the conflict between m1 and m2: the
higher the K, the higher the conflict. The meaning of K
can be understood from its definition, since K is obtained by
accumulating the product of masses assigned to sets having
empty intersection (which means incompatible propositions).
Furthermore, we see that Dempster’s combination rule treats
conflict as a normalization factor, so its presence is no longer
visible after fusion.
Recall the example in section II-A, and suppose that we
obtain evidence coming from another doctor, who is not a
cancer specialist, about the variable C. Let us call m1 the
BBA in eq. (2) and m2 the new assignment; so we have:
m1(X) =
(
0:8 for X = facg
0:2 for X = fncg
m2(X) =
(
0:1 for X = facg
0:9 for X = fac [ ncg
Note that since the second doctor is not a specialist the
information he provides is quite limited: most of the mass
is assigned to doubt. Fusing the two pieces of information
according to Dempster’s rule results in:
m12(X) =
8><>:
0:80:1+0:80:9
1 (0:10:2) = 0:816 for X = facg
0:20:9
1 (0:10:2) = 0:184 for X = fncg
We see that after fusion values are not far from those
already assigned by m1: this is perfectly intuitive, since
the second doctor did not bring a clear contribution to the
diagnosis. Notice also that for the same reason, and for the
low confidence of first doctor about absence of cancer, little
conflict is observed (K = 0:02).
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Dempster’s rule has many properties [18], in this work we
are mainly interested in its associativity and commutativity,
that is:
Bel1  (Bel2 Bel3) = (Bel1 Bel2)Bel3 (4)
Bel1 Bel2 = Bel2 Bel1 (5)
Despite its many desirable properties, Dempster’s rule is not
idempotent; this means that observing twice the same evidence
results in stronger beliefs. This is the reason why we need to
introduce the hypothesis of independent sources in Dempster’s
combination rule. In practice, before letting a new source of
information enter the system, we must always look at how
the new information is collected, to ensure that we are not
counting twice the same evidence. In our example, we must
be sure that doctors did not talk with each other, did not use
the same technology when performing measurements, and so
on.
The combination rule expressed in eq. (3) is applicable if
the two BBAs, m1 and m2, are defined over the same frame,
which means that they refer to the same propositions. When-
ever we need to combine BBAs defined over different frames,
we have to redefine them on the same target frame before the
combination. This can be done by using marginalization and
vacuous extension.
Definition 4: Let m be a BBA function defined over a
frame , and let 
 be another frame. The vacuous extension
of m to the product space   
, denoted with m"
,
is defined as:
m"
(X) =
(
m(A) if X = A 
; A  
0 otherwise
This allows to extend the frame of a BBA without introducing
extraneous assumptions (no new information is provided about
propositions that are not in ). That said, vacuous extension is
not the only possible way to extend a BBA to a larger frame:
it just provides the “least informative” extension.
The inverse operation of vacuous extension is marginaliza-
tion.
Definition 5: Let m be a BBA function defined on a
domain , its marginalization to the frame    , denoted
with m# , is defined as
m# (X) =
X
A#X
m(A)
where the index of the summation denotes all sets A  
whose projection on   is X .
To outline the projection operator, let us introduce two product
frames  and  , that are obtained as the cartesian product of
the frames of some variables. Formally, we have  = F1 
F2      Fk and   = FS1  FS2     FSz , where Fj is the
frame of the j-th variable and S is a subset of the indices in
f1; : : : ; kg. Each element of  will be a vector whose j-th
component is a value in Fj .2 The projection operator maps
2For instance, if  = XY Z one possible element of  is (x1; y3; z1),
where x1 2 X , y3 2 Y and z1 2 Z.
each element  2  into an element of  2   by removing
from  all the components whose indices are not in S.3
The importance of extension and marginalization is that
they allow to combine over a common frame BBAs originally
referring to different frames, hence enabling us to fuse them
with Dempster’s rule.
III. DST-BASED DECISION FUSION IN IMAGE FORENSICS
By using the basic instruments of DST introduced in the
previous section, we developed a framework for combining ev-
idence coming from two or more forgery detection algorithms.
In particular we focus on the splicing detection problem, which
consists in determining if a region of an image has been pasted
from another. As already stated, during this process some
traces are left into the image, depending on the modality used
to create the forgery. The presence of each of these traces can
be revealed by using one (or more) image forensic tools, each
of which provides information about the presence of the trace
it is looking for. Note that, in splicing detection tasks, most
forensic tools assume knowledge of the suspect region. That
said, if no information is available, we could still run all tools
in a block-wise fashion, and fuse their outputs at the block
level. As we will highlight in Section V, forgery localization
is a different problem, that we will consider from the decision
fusion point of view in future works.
A. Assumptions
Our framework for decision fusion relies on the basic
assumptions listed below:
1) Each tool outputs a number in [0,1], where higher values
indicate higher confidence about the analyzed region
containing the searched trace;
2) Compatibility relations among some or all of the con-
sidered traces are known, at least theoretically (for in-
stance, we may know that two tools search for mutually-
exclusive traces).
3) Information about tools reliability, possibly image de-
pendent, is available (for instance such an information
could derive from published results or from experimental
evidence);
4) Each tool gathers information independently of other
tools (i.e. a tool is never employed as a subroutine
of another, and no information is exchanged between
tools), and by different means (each tool relies on a
different principle or effect);
These assumptions are very reasonable in the current image
forensics scenario; nevertheless, some of them can be relaxed
with a limited impact on our framework. For example, in
Section III-D we discuss how to handle the case where some
relationships between traces are not known, and in Section
IV-B we show that errors in estimating tool reliabilities do
not affect overall performance significantly.
Notice that assumption 4 is needed to ensure that we can
fuse tool responses using Dempster’s rule. Intuitively, it means
3For example, if we project the set  = X  Y  Z to   = X  Z the
element (x1; y3; z1) 2  reduces to (x1; z1) 2  
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that if we observe two different tools supporting the same
proposition, we are more confident than observing only one.
On the other hand, if two tools that search for the same trace
exploiting the same model are available, it makes sense to
discard the less reliable one, since its contribution will be
limited or null. That said, and also considering that the concept
of independence in DST is not equivalent to statistical indepen-
dence, we believe that possible limited dependencies between
algorithms would not undermine the developed framework.
B. Formalization for the single-tool case
For sake of clarity, we start by formalizing the DST frame-
work when only one tool is available, let us call it ToolA, which
returns a value A 2 [0; 1] and has a reliability R 2 [0; 1]. While
in our previous work [2] we directly modeled the output of
the tool with a variable, here we propose a different point
of view, that improves the extendability and generality of the
framework: we focus on the trace searched by the tool, and
we consider the information coming from ToolA about the
trace, by introducing a variable , with frame  = ft, ng,
where t is the proposition “trace  is present” and n is the
proposition “trace  is not present”. We model the information
provided by ToolA about the presence of  with the following
BBA over the frame :
mA (X) =
8><>:
AT for X = f(t)g
AN for X = f(n)g
ATN for X = f(t) [ (n)g
(6)
where AT , AN and ATN are functions (see next section and
Fig.1) of the response A of the tool. We see that this BBA
assigns a mass to every element of the power set of ; f(t)
[ (n)g is the doubt that ToolA has about the presence of the
trace, so it refers to the proposition “trace  is either present
or not”.
1) Detection mapping: The way A is mapped into AT ,
AN and ATN is an interpretation of ToolA response and is
simply models the behavior of the tool. For example we may
know, either from theory or from experimental results, that any
value above 0.5 should be interpreted as a strong belief about
the trace being present, so AT should be near to 1 when tool
output crosses 0.5. We formalize this concept introducing three
functions T (), N () and TN (), all from [0,1] to [0,1],
which map the detection score (A in this case) to a value
for AT , AN and ATN respectively. These functions can be
either obtained from theoretical analysis or from experiments
(training); since each tool will probably distribute its output
in the interval [0,1] in a characteristic way, we do not impose
a general rule for performing these assignments. What is
important is that they depend only on the specific tool, so
they do not require any cross-tool information. An example of
mapping is given in Fig.1.
2) Incorporation of reliability within the framework: When
we combine evidence using Dempster’s rule, it is assumed
that masses are assigned by reliable sources; if we have some
information about the reliability of the sources, then it should
be taken into account. This can be done through a mechanism
called discounting [13], which permits to weigh each source by
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Tool output
M
as
s
Tool  response interpretation
µT
µN
µTN
Fig. 1. An example of mapping the tool answer to mass assignments. Such an
example is typical for tools featuring a good separation between positive and
negative examples: most training examples yield very low (< 0:2) or high
(> 0:6) values, while nothing is observed in the middle range. Therefore,
should the tool provide 0.5 as output, we can not say anything about the class
of the sample (i.e., we have only doubt).
its reliability. If we denote with AR the reliability of ToolA,
applying discounting to the BBA in eq. (6) yields4:
mAtot(X) =
(
ARAT for X= f(t)g
ARAN for X= f(n)g
CA for X= f(t) [ (n)g
(7)
where CA = (1 AR(AT +AN )). The effect of discounting
is better understood by considering the extreme cases for
reliability: if the tool is fully reliable (AR = 1) its response
is totally believed, while if it is fully unreliable (AR = 0) we
do not say anything about the presence of the trace since all
the mass moves to doubt.
C. Introducing new tools
Suppose we want to introduce in our framework a new
tool, ToolB, that satisfies the assumptions in section III-A.
Differently from our previous work [2], we distinguish two
cases: the new tool may either search for a trace that is already
considered in the framework, or for a novel trace; these cases
are addressed differently in our framework.
1) Introduction of a tool looking for a known trace: If
the trace searched by the new tool is already present in the
framework (let us call it , as in section III-B), applying the
procedure in section III-B will produce mBtot , which can be
directly fused with mAtot by using Dempster’s rule, yielding:
mABtot(X) =
1
1 K 
8>><>>:
ARAT CB+CABRBT
+ARAT BRBT for X= f(t)g
AN ARCB+CABN BR
+AN ARBN BR for X= f(n)g
CACB for X= f(t) [ (n)g
(8)
where K = AN AR BT BR+AT AR BN BR. This BBA
contains the information about the trace  gathered by the two
distinct tools. We see that conflict is non-null, and is obtained
4The formal derivation of this formula is provided in Appendix A.
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by summing the masses for propositions in which the tools are
reliable but provide conflicting information about the presence
of the trace. It is worth repeating that before introducing a new
tool into the framework, the user should understand how the
tool works and ensure that it does not replicate the job of a
tool that is already present, since this would violate the request
of independence of sources, and lead to a overestimation of
the presence of the trace the new tool is looking for.
2) Introduction of a tool looking for a new trace: If ToolB
searches for a novel kind of trace, say , we have to introduce
it into the framework defining a new frame  = ft; ng,
where the propositions have the same meaning as in section
III-B. The response of ToolB will be used to assign masses to
the variable  , and application of discounting will lead us to
m

Btot
. Since  and  are defined over different frames, mAtot
and mBtot cannot be fused directly. We first need to define a
common frame   , so that we can (vacuously) extend
both mAtot and mBtot to it and finally fuse them, yielding:
m

ABtot
(X) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
ARAT BRBT for X= f (t, t)g
ARAT BRBN for X= f(t, n) g
ARAT CB for X= f(t, t) [ (t, n) g
ARAN BRBT for X= f(n, t) g
ARAN BRBN for X= f(n, n) g
ARAN CB for X= f(n, t) [ (n, n) g
CABRBT for X= f(t, t) [ (n, t) g
CABRBN for X= f (t, n) [ (n, n)g
CACB for X= f(t;t)[(n;t)
[(t;n)[(n;n)g
Notice that we are not considering whether traces  and  are
compatible or not: we will take this information into account
only later on, exploiting the associativity and commutativity of
Dempster’s rule. Consequently, as confirmed by the fact that
K = 0 in the above formula, there is no reason why the two
tools should be conflicting, since by now we are looking for
“unrelated” traces.
The Procedures in section III-C1 and III-C2 can be repeated
when another tool ToolX becomes available. The associativity
of Dempster’s rule, defined in eq. (4), allows to combine
directly the BBA mXtot of the new tool with the one cur-
rently available (that takes into account all the tools in the
framework), so we will always need to extend the frame of,
at most, two BBAs: this is a considerably smaller effort with
respect to extending the BBA and computing the combination
rule for all the tools.
We stress that, compared to [2], using traces as basic entities
(instead of tools responses) strongly improves the extendability
of the framework: as a matter of fact, while new tools are
being released quite often, many of them search for an already
known trace; if this is the case, introducing a new tool is very
simple since only its BBA has to be extended.
D. Compatibility among traces
So far we have considered traces as if they were unrelated
from each other. However, as we noted in III-A, this is not
always the case in real applications. Suppose, for instance,
that we have two traces  and  and suppose that, ideally,
only some of their combinations are possible. For example, it
may be that the presence of  implies the absence of , so, at
least ideally, two tools searching for these traces should never
detect tampering simultaneously.
This information induces a compatibility relation between
frames  and  , meaning that some of the elements of the
cartesian product are impossible (and hence should be
removed from the frame of discernment, because by definition
it contains only possible values of the variables, see section
II-A). However, since we do not know in advance which traces
will be introduced in our framework, we need a way to include
this knowledge only in the late stage of fusion. Fortunately, in
DST we can easily model this information by using a standard
belief assignment: we define a BBA on the domain  
 , that has only one focal set, containing the union of all
propositions (i.e, combination of traces) that are considered
possible, while all others have a null mass. For example the
following BBA:
mcomp(X) =
n
1 for X= f(t;n)[(n;t)[(n;n)g
0 for X= f(t;t)g (9)
models the incompatibility between traces  and . Thanks to
the commutative property of Dempster’s combination rule, this
BBA can be combined with those coming from traces in the
final stage of fusion. In such a way, information about tools
relationships are exploited only at the very end and hence do
not hinder model extendability.
Notice that the given formulation encompasses also the case
where the relationship between two traces is not known: it is
sufficient to put those propositions where the two traces are
present in both the focal set and the impossible set of mcomp,
and this will automatically result in a void contribution for
that combination of traces during fusion.
The last step of our decision fusion process consists in
fusing the compatibility BBA defined above with the BBA
obtained combining evidences from all the available tools,
yielding a global BBA mFIN . Notice that in this last applica-
tion of Dempster’s rule all the conflict that may arise is due
to incompatibilities between traces. Although this conflict is
normalized away by Dempster’s rule, the value of K can be
recorded and used to evaluate how “unexpected” the output
of tools were. Very high values of conflict may indicate
that the image under analysis does not respect the working
assumptions of one or more tools. The overall decision fusion
approach described so far is summarized in Fig.2 for the case
of two tools.
It is worth noting that, we did not need to introduce a-priori
probabilities about an image being original or forged, or prior
probabilities of presence of traces: in a Bayesian framework,
this would have been difficult to obtain.
E. Dealing with many traces: hierarchical modeling
Since the extension to novel traces is based on cartesian
product of sets, the number of variables in the framework
grows exponentially with the number of different traces.
However, this consideration holds only if the user is interested
in a fusion approach that fully preserves the granularity of
information, meaning that, after fusing several different traces,
the user wants to get the beliefs about presence/absence of
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Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed fusion approach. Notice that, when a new tool becomes available (represented in the dashed cloud), its BBA directly
enters the final stage of the fusion, without needing to recombine information from previous tools.
each single trace separately. In practice, however, the presence
of many traces is probably due to the fact that the framework is
taking into account different classes of phenomena, e.g. traces
related to camera artifacts, to JPEG coding, to geometrical
inconsistencies, and so on. In such a scenario, it makes sense
to treat each class of traces as a whole, and directly consider
the contribution of each class when taking the final decision.
This hierarchical fusion can be easily implemented within
the proposed framework by using belief marginalization (see
Definition 5) to collapse the contribution of several traces
of the same class into a single variable, thus reducing the
granularity of the information without hindering performance
in terms of splicing detection. In Fig.3 we draw an example of
hierarchical fusion applied to three different kinds of traces.
Furthermore, compatibility among classes of traces can be
introduced as well, at the end of the fusion chain.
F. Final decision
We are now ready to define the final output of the fusion
procedure: we want to know whether a given region of an
image has been tampered with or not. To do so we consider
the belief of two sets: the first one, T , is the union of all
propositions in which at least one trace is detected, the second
one, N , is the single proposition in which none of the traces is
found (in the previous example it would be N = (n; n)).
The output of the fusion process therefore consists of two
belief values, Bel(T ) and Bel(N), calculated over the BBA
mFIN defined in section III-D. Optionally, we may also
consider the normalization factorK (as defined in section II-B)
of the last fusion step, involving the compatibility table. These
outputs summarize the information provided by the available
tools, without forcing a final decision. If a binary decision
about image authenticity is required, an interpretation of these
outputs has to be made; the most intuitive binarization rule
is to classify an image as tampered with when the belief
for the presence of at least one trace is stronger than the
belief for the total absence of traces, that is to say when
Bel(T ) > Bel(N). Of course, we will probably want to meet
a minimum distance requirement between the two: a Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve can thus be obtained
by classifying images according to Bel(T ) > Bel(N) + ,
sampling  in [-1,1].
It is worth noting that evaluating belief values is a very
simple task: only elementary operations among scalar values in
[0,1] have to be calculated (see for example mass assignments
in equation (8)), since the model is built only once for a fixed
set of tools, and need to be extended only when new sources
of information become available.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to validate the effectiveness of the proposed ap-
proach, we compared it with three other methods. The first is
one of those proposed in [12], where image manipulations
are detected by taking the logical disjunction (OR) of the
outputs of single tools. Logical disjunction is indeed one of the
simplest and most widely used methods for decision fusion,
and is quite well-suited to the proposed case study5. Further-
more, since we know the logical relationships between traces,
the second method we compare with is a rule-based logical
disjunction: in this case, only the combinations of binarized
outputs that are consistent with known traces relationships are
considered, while the others are discarded. By comparing with
this technique, we want to investigate whether the proposed
framework actually yields some advantages with respect to
this simpler hard-reasoning method, based on the same prior
knowledge about trace relationships.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, several methods have
been proposed for decision fusion at the feature level in image
forensics [9] [10] [11] [14], but they are typically based on
feature selection and are therefore not directly comparable to
the method proposed in this work. On the other hand, since
most methods end up using a classifier (usually an SVM)
the best we can do to compare our framework with them
without exiting the measurement level is to train an SVM by
using the scalar output of the tools as input features, and see
how the SVM performs in discriminating between tampered
and original images. Finally, we observe that our framework
is not comparable with [15], because we are considering a
complex scenario, where tools may search for compatible or
incompatible traces, and more than one tool may be available
5Actually, taking the OR of binarized outputs is an “abstract level”
approach. However, logical disjunction is one of the most used approaches
among the post-classification ones [8], so we decided to compare our method
against it.
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Fig. 3. Block diagram illustrating the proposed approach to hierarchical fusion of traces of different kind. The “Trace-Based Fusion” bubble represents the
schema in Fig.2. For the sake of clarity, in the figure we write “Tool data” instead of separately drawing output and reliability assignments for each tool.
for the same trace, so applying directly Dempster’s rule would
lead to erroneous conclusions.
A. Experimental setup
As already stated, we evaluated the validity of the new DST
fusion framework by focusing on the detection of splicing
attacks: a portion of an image (source) is cut and pasted
into another image (host), thus producing a new content that
is finally saved. Because most images are stored in JPEG
format, a great deal of research has been carried out for the
identification and detection of traces left by splicing attacks in
JPEG images, so several tools are available to search for them.
In our experiments we fused the outputs obtained from five of
these tools, searching for a total of three different traces.
1) Selected traces and tools: To explore all the features
of the proposed scheme, we chose a set of algorithms such
that some of them search for the same trace, and for which
some combination of traces is not possible. Namely, we are
considering the following traces (see Fig.4 for a graphical
explanation):
1) Misaligned JPEG compression (JPNA): this trace shows
up when the investigated region is cropped from a
JPEG image and pasted into the target picture without
preserving JPEG grid alignment, performing a final
JPEG compression. Therefore, pasted pixels undergo
two misaligned compressions, while others do not.
2) Double quantization (JPDQ): when a portion of uncom-
pressed pixels6 is pasted into a JPEG image, and the final
result is JPEG saved, the untouched region undergoes a
double compression. This causes its DCT coefficients
6or pixels that have been compressed according to a different grid.
to be doubly quantized, leaving a characteristic trace in
their statistics.
3) JPEG ghost (JPGH): this trace is left when a region is
cut-and-pasted, respecting grid alignment, from a JPEG
source image into the host one (which has not been
JPEG compressed). When the obtained splicing is JPEG
saved, the inserted part undergoes a second compression,
while the outer is compressed for the first time, thus
introducing an inconsistency.
Given the above definitions, some combination of traces
are not possible. For example an attack that introduces the
JPDQ trace also introduces the JPGH, while the contrary
is not necessarily true; but, if both JPGH and JPNA are
introduced, then also JPDQ must be present. These facts are
best represented by using a tabular form (see section III-D)
with the compatibility relations, as in Tab. I.
TABLE I
DETECTION COMPATIBILITY: EACH COLUMN OF THE TABLE FORMS A
COMBINATION OF PRESENCE (Y) AND ABSENCE (N) OF TRACES. WE SEE
THAT ONLY 5 OUT OF 8 COMBINATIONS ARE POSSIBLE.
Trace Possible Excluded
JPNA Y N N Y N Y Y N
JPDQ N Y N Y N Y N Y
JPGH N Y Y Y N N Y N
Now that we have introduced the traces considered in our
experiments, we list the adopted forensic tools (see Tab. II).
We employed two tools looking for JPNA, namely the one
from Luo et al. [5] (ToolA) and the one from Bianchi et al.
[4] (ToolD); two tools looking for JPDQ, the one from Lin et
al.[6] (ToolB) and the one from Bianchi et al. [3] (ToolE); and
the tool from Farid that searches for ghost traces [7] (ToolC).
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Fig. 4. In these schemes three different configuration of cut&paste attacks are reported. The attack in (a) introduces a misaligned double compression, the
one in (b) introduces the double quantization effect in the untouched part of the final image and the attack in (c) introduces the ghost effect in the pasted
region.
TABLE II
COUPLING BETWEEN TRACES AND TOOLS: FOR EACH TRACE, THE LIST OF
ADOPTED TOOLS ABLE TO DETECT IT IS GIVEN.
Trace Tools
JPNA ToolA [5], ToolD [4]
JPDQ ToolB [6], ToolE [3]
JPGH ToolC [7]
In section III-A we assumed that each tool outputs a value in
[0,1], where values near 1 indicate high confidence about the
analyzed region containing the searched trace. Although not
strictly necessary, normalization of tool outputs is desirable
also for other fusion techniques, so we choose to adopt it
as a common step before applying any fusion method in our
experiments. In the following we give a brief description of
how each of the selected tools works and define the approach
we adopted to obtain a scalar output from it:
 ToolA searches for misaligned compression by measuring
inconsistencies in blocking artifacts in the spatial domain.
Because features are classified by using an SVM (which
we trained on a separated dataset, according to the
original work) we train a model supporting probability
estimates [19];
 ToolB and ToolE search for double quantization effect
employing two different statistical models to analyze the
histogram of the DCT coefficients of the image. Both
tools provide a probability map which gives, for each 88
pixel block, its probability of being original (i.e. showing
double quantization) or tampered (not showing double
quantization). The final detection value is taken as the
median (over the suspect region only) of the probability
map;
 ToolC searches ghost artifacts by re-compressing the im-
age at several different qualities and taking the difference
between the given image and the re-compressed one.
Ghost effect is detected when the difference is small for
the suspect region and not for the rest of the image. To
evaluate how much the two regions are separated the KS
statistic is used [7]. We directly take the value of this
statistic as the detection value;
 ToolD searches for misaligned double compression ex-
ploiting the fact that DCT coefficients exhibit an integer
periodicity when the DCT is computed according to the
grid of the primary compression. Being the shift of the
grid unknown, the algorithm searches among all possible
shifts the one that minimizes a specific metric (see [4]
for details). We scale and invert this metric from [0,6] to
[0,1].
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, usually the
simple presence of a trace does not imply a splicing attack, but
just that a common processing over the image has taken place
(for example, cropping a couple of rows from the top of the
image would introduce a JPNA trace). Instead, inconsistencies
in the presence of a trace through the image (i.e. high detection
values for the suspect region and low for the other or vice-
versa) are far more suspect. For this reason, each tool7 is run
both on the suspect region and on the remaining part of the
image, and the absolute difference between the two outputs
(which will still be in [0,1]) is considered.
Notice that since DST does not require that the masses
assigned to propositions have a probabilistic meaning, we do
not need to use more complex approaches to cast the output
of each tool.
2) Training procedure: For all the fusion techniques used in
the tests we need to run a training phase; however, in the pro-
posed framework training is performed one tool at a time. The
key idea is that if we can perform training separately for each
tool, then we neither need a complicated learning technique,
which would probably overfit on the training examples, nor
we need huge datasets, since generating a dataset representing
one kind of forgery is typically not difficult. In the following,
the training procedures for each method are explained:
7ToolC is excluded since it already considers inconsistencies over the
image.
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 DST fusion. The DST based framework requires only to
specify the mapping functions (T , N and TN ) of each
algorithm, as defined in section III-B1. We found that it
is not necessary to use a fitting technique for tuning these
curves: it is sufficient to qualitatively consider how the
output of a tool is distributed in the range [0,1] when the
tool is run on forged and original images respectively8,
and draw trapezoidal functions consequently (see Fig.5).
By relying on published results and on our tests about
tools performance, we also defined the reliability of the
various tools as follows: for ToolA, ToolD and ToolE
reliability is a function of quality factor QF2, according
to published results (see, respectively [5], [4] and [3]),
for ToolB we experimentally determined a BR=0.4 and
for ToolC we set CR=0.85 according to experiments in
[7].
 SVM fusion. A training example for the SVM is obtained
from each image. The array of features is obtained by
concatenating the outputs given for the image by each
tool and the last quality factor9, estimated from JPEG
quantization tables. We use a RBF kernel with parameters
(obtained through a 5-fold cross validation)  = 2:48 and
C = 0:1. For all the experiments, we repeated 20 times
the training-testing phase, choosing different train- and
test- datasets from the available examples (datasets are
described later on).
 OR-based fusion. Since we are going to use Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves to compare the
various methods, we need to train an aggregate ROC for
the five algorithms, which represents their behavior in
terms of probability of detection (pD) and false alarm
(pFA) after being combined with the OR operator. To
obtain these curves we uniformly sample (with precision
10 3) the ROC of each algorithm, considering only im-
ages that satisfy the corresponding working assumptions,
as reported in Tab. III. For each algorithm we save
the threshold associated with each pFA. During the test
phase, given a target overall probability of false alarm
p^FA, we choose for each algorithm the threshold that
gave a probability of false alarm of p^FA=5, and we use
that threshold to binarize its output. Binarized outputs for
each image are combined with the OR operator, giving
the final classification, that allows drawing a point of the
overall ROC. Also in this case, the train-test procedure
is repeated 20 times.
 OR-based fusion with Hard Reasoning. The same ap-
proach described for OR-based fusion is also used in the
experiment with hard-reasoning logical disjunction (that
will be abbreviated with OR-HR in figures). The differ-
ence is that, after binarization, only the combinations of
outputs that are consistent with traces relationships will
contribute to classify an image as tampered.
8In this phase we consider only images that match the working assumptions
the tool is built on.
9We introduce this information because last quantization value strongly
affects the reliability of tools. Since this information is used in the proposed
model, not providing it to the SVM would be unfair.
It is worth stressing that, training of the SVM for the
considered decision fusion task requires not only to create
a training dataset for each tool: a set of examples must be
created for each possible combination of traces that the system
should recognize. As we will show in the experiments, if the
SVM is asked to classify a forgery containing a never-seen
combination of traces, misclassifications are likely to occur.
This fact has two consequences: first, the size of the training
dataset grows exponentially with the number of different
traces; secondly, only synthetically generated forgeries can be
reasonably employed to create such a dataset. Unfortunately,
synthetic examples are not really representative of the real
world forgeries. This necessity is avoided with the DST
framework, since determining mapping functions does not
require any cross-tool training: a (usually quite small) dataset
suffices to understand the behavior of the tool when is run on
images that show exactly the trace the tool is looking for. The
functions mapping the detection values into BBAs (eq. 6) for
the selected tools are reported in Fig.5. These curves have been
obtained considering the histogram of each algorithm outputs
on the training dataset (both for original and tampered images)
and mimicking it with trapezoidal functions, thus introducing
a sort of smoothness constraint. Another possibility could be
to fit a function to the cumulant of the histograms, however
small variations in the shape of curves do not affects results
significantly.
As shown in Fig.5, doubt is used only for regions where
few examples from both tampered and original classes are
observed. On the contrary, doubt is not employed when
detection values overlap for a consistent number of examples,
because this indicates that, on average, tools are “equally
sure” about those images being tampered or original instead
of unsure about both.
3) Datasets: As stated in section IV-A2, each of the three
compared methods requires a training phase, so we created
a dataset of 4800 tampered and 4800 original images. We
considered four different tampering procedures (described in
Tab. III) that start from an uncompressed image and automat-
ically produce a forgery by cutting a portion (256x256 pixel)
of the image and pasting it into a copy of itself, exactly in
the same position. So doing, the forged image is perceptually
above suspicion, and abrupt changes in content, that could
influence the algorithms performance, are avoided. This also
mimics the work of an image editing expert, which would limit
discontinuities along the boundary of the tampered region.
In every procedure the created splicing is JPEG compressed
and saved. Notice that the four tampering classes we used
cover all the possible combinations of presence/absence of
the considered traces10, as can be seen by comparing Tab. IV
and Tab. I. The quality factor of the first compression, QF1,
is chosen randomly from the set f40, 50, ..., 80g, while the
quality of the second compression is set to QF2 = QF1+20.
Forgeries of the training set are equally distributed among
these classes (1200 images per class).
The original, non-tampered, images are obtained by ap-
10Notice also that a generic JPEG spliced image will almost surely fall in
one of these classes.
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Fig. 5. For each tool, the histogram of detection values on training dataset are shown on the left image. Right images show how this histogram is interpreted
to define a mapping from tool detection value (x-axis) to mass assignment (y-axis). See eq. 6 for an explanation of each line meaning.
plying JPEG compression to uncompressed TIFF images
(1024x1024 pixels), choosing randomly the quality factor from
the set f40, 50, ..., 100g.
It is interesting to evaluate the performance of the consid-
ered decision fusion methods in two different scenarios:
1) in the first experiment, we use the synthetic images both
to train and test the methods, of course with separated
test and train datasets. The main goal of this experiment
is to check if the training is effective for each method;
we will refer to this dataset as the “synthetic” dataset. To
show that the SVM really needs to have examples of all
possible combinations of traces during training, we also
train an “handicap”-SVM, where the handicap consists
in removing all images belonging to Class 1 from the
training set.
2) the second experiment mimics a realistic scenario. A
team of students created 70 forgeries using common
photo editing software, respecting only a constraint
about JPEG quality factors: the quality factor of the final
compression is always higher than the one of the host
image. Students were asked to provide both tampered
images (along with an indication of the attacked region)
and original ones, for a total of 140 images. Although
being rather small (creating good forgeries is a time
consuming procedure) this dataset is crucial to under-
stand how well the considered frameworks generalize
to unseen cases. We will refer to this dataset as the
“realistic” dataset. According to a realistic scenario, this
dataset is used only for testing, training is still performed
on synthetical images.
The train- and test- datasets we used in our experiments
are available at the website http://clem.dii.unisi.it/vipp/index.
php/download/imagerepository
B. Results and discussion
We ran the five forensic tools on each dataset, then we
combined their responses by the different fusion methods. To
allow a comparison between tool performance we use ROC
curves. However, both the SVM and the DST frameworks
have been trained in order to maximize the overall accuracy,
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TABLE III
PROCEDURE FOR THE CREATION OF DIFFERENT CLASSES OF TAMPERING
IN THE TRAINING DATASET.
Class Procedure Result
Class 1 Region is cut from a JPEG
image and pasted, breaking the
8x8 grid, into an uncompressed
one; the result is saved as
JPEG.
Inner region shows
JPNA trace, external
region does not.
Only tool A detects
this trace.
Class 2 Region is taken from an un-
compressed image and pasted
into a JPEG one; the result is
saved as JPEG.
Outer region shows
both JPDQ and JPGH
traces, inner does not.
Tools B, E and C
detect this trace
Class 3 Region is cut from a JPEG
image and pasted into an un-
compressed one in a position
multiple of the 8x8 grid; result
is saved as JPEG.
The inner region
shows JPGH effect,
the outer does not.
Only Tool C detects.
Class 4 Region is cut from a JPEG
image and pasted (without re-
specting the original 8x8 grid)
into a JPEG image; the result
is saved as JPEG
The inner region shows
JPNA, the outer shows
JPDQ and JPGH.
All tools detect this
trace.
TABLE IV
THIS TABLE SPECIFIES WHETHER THE CLASS OF TAMPERING (COLUMN)
SHOWS (Y) OR NOT (N) THE TRACE ON THE LEFT ROW. COMPARING THIS
TO TAB. I SHOWS THAT OUR DATASET HAS A CLASS FOR EACH OF THE
possible COMBINATIONS OF TRACES PRESENCE.
Trace Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Original
JPNA Y N N Y N
JPDQ N Y N Y N
JPGH N Y Y Y N
given by the percentage of correctly classified examples11.
This urges us to consider only the portion of ROCs with
reasonably low probabilities of false alarm; we fix the limit
to 30%, a value that is far higher than acceptable ones in a
standard forensic scenario. For each of the test datasets we
report and comment the ROC curve (averaged over the 20
train-test iterations) obtained with each fusion method along
with the ROC curves obtained by the single tools. Notice
that since the proposed method does not require a training
phase, no cross-fold validation is performed for it and we can
use all the images to test it. For the other methods, we also
plot uncertainty bars showing the maximum and minimum
probability of detection obtained within the 20 iterations for
several probability of false alarms. Values for the Area Under
Curve (AUC) are normalized to the considered interval.
a) Results on the synthetic dataset: Fig.6 illustrates the
results of the experiments taken on the synthetic dataset.
Although being trained without cross-tool information (except
for the traces compatibility table) the proposed method almost
retains the same performance showed by the SVM (Fig. 6a).
Considering that the synthetic test dataset is very similar to the
training one, and considering also the high ratio of examples
versus features (9600 images for 6 scalar normalized features),
retaining the same performance of a SVM classifier is an un-
11A training targeted to obtain a specified false alarm probability would
require for the SVM to find an appropriate balance of the weights assigned
to misclassified examples; and for the DST framework to adjust accordingly
the mapping functions.
doubtedly good result. Both the SVM and the DST framework
overcome the logical disjunction method, which nevertheless
shows good performance. On the other hand, performance of
the handicap-SVM are seriously hindered by the fact that some
of the test images contain a combination of traces (namely,
images belonging to Class 1) that were not in the training set.
We considered the average performance (over 20 experiments)
of the SVM in classifying test images belonging to Class 1:
when the handicap is not present, the average accuracy is
77.2%; when the handicap-SVM is used, performance drops to
18.7%. This fact is extremely important since, as the number
of traces increases, creating datasets with a sufficient number
of forgery examples for each possible combination becomes
complicated. On the other hand, the proposed method does
not exhibit a significant performance deterioration. Notice that,
in this experiment, the hard-reasoning method (blue curve in
Fig.6a) yields the worst performance, meaning that application
of rules from Tab. IV does not provide any help to the logical
disjunction: this is reasonable, since images of this dataset are
synthetically generated according to tool working hypotheses,
and will unlikely expose unexpected combination of traces.
However, looking at performance of single tools, in Fig. 6b,
we see a clear benefit from the use of each of the decision
fusion techniques.
We also used the synthetic dataset to investigate the sensi-
tiveness of the DST-based framework to fluctuations of tool
reliabilities. We repeated 20 times the classification, perturbing
the reliability of tools with a gaussian error ( = 0,  = 0:15),
and collecting from each experiment the resulting AUC. We
observed a standard deviation for the AUC of 0.02, thus
showing the robustness of the framework against inaccurate
estimation of reliabilities.
b) Results on the realistic dataset: Fig.7 shows results
obtained using the realistic dataset. The inherent difference
between synthetic training examples and real-world splicings
has a direct implication on performance of single tools (com-
pare Fig.6b with Fig.7b), and this is not surprising. What
is really important is that performance of decision fusion
methods are even more affected: the DST framework now
clearly overcomes the SVM classifier, and also the hard-
reasoning logical disjunction method behaves better than the
SVM. This suggests that when knowledge about relationships
between traces is available, we should introduce this knowl-
edge as directly as possible instead of using machine learning
methods, that are more suited to scenarios where knowledge
is somewhat hidden in data. In forensics, such relationships
are known most of the times, because they depend on some
physical or logical phenomenon (e.g., camera interpolation or
noise, JPEG quantization effects, shadow consistency, etc.)
whose compatibility with other effects can be easily argued
or measured with a targeted experiment.
Finally we point out that, except for very low probabilities
of false alarms (< 2%), the performance of the DST method
is always better than those provided by each single tool.
We conclude this section discussing the computational time
of our system. As stated in previous sections, framework
definition and belief evaluation are two separated and different
tasks: the first one is executed off-line when a new tool enters
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the system, producing a formula that is stored; this formula is
then used for belief evaluation, which represents the on-line
phase of the system and is much faster. Table V shows the
time12 needed to build the framework and to perform belief
evaluation for the 5 tools used in this section. We also show
how times would change if two more tools searching for one
new trace enter the system.
TABLE V
EXECUTION TIMES (IN SECONDS) FOR FRAMEWORK DEFINITION AND
BELIEF EVALUATION.
Num. of Tools 2 3 4 5 6 7
Definition 0.11 0.27 0.75 0.70 2.7 39.8
Evaluation 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.23 0.81 1.3
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed a framework and discussed
a system for data fusion in image forensics. The proposed
system operates by fusing the output of a pool of forensic
tools at the measurement level thus permitting to retain as
much information as possible with regard to the single tool
analysis, without incurring in the problems typical of feature
fusion techniques (curse of dimensionality, training complex-
ity, redundant features and so on).
The peculiarities of the proposed framework include: i)
the use of a soft reasoning approach, based on Dempster-
Shafer theory of evidence, to cope with the lack of a priori-
information about the kind of tampering the image may
have undergone, and the possibility that the available forensic
tools provide incomplete and even conflicting evidence, ii)
the ease with which new information can be included as
soon as it becomes available, iii) the hierarchical structure
of the framework that allows to trade-off between granularity
of the information provided by the fusion system and the
complexity of the update procedure when the information
becomes available.
Experimental results are encouraging: the proposed model
gives significantly better results than fusion approaches based
on logical disjunction, and outperforms SVM-based fusion
when tested against a realistic dataset.
We believe data fusion is a key ingredient to go beyond
the current state of the art in image forensics, making it
suitable to work in a real world setting where the strictly
controlled conditions typical of laboratory experiments can not
be enforced. Even more, we are convinced that data fusion can
also help to cope with the proliferation of counter-forensics
techniques. As a matter of fact, it is quite easy to fool a
forensic analysis based on a single detection tool, especially
if the algorithm the tool relies on is known to the attacker;
however, facing with a pool of forensic tools, whose output
is fused in a clever way, is likely to be a much harder piece
of work, given that hiding a tampering trace may introduce
additional traces whose presence can be spotted by other
detectors in the pool.
12Values have been obtained running a Matlab implementation of the
fusion framework on a laptop computer equipped with a Pentium Core2 Duo
2.26GHz CPU, 4GB RAM.
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Fig. 6. Results on the synthetic test dataset both using the decision fusion
methods (a) and each algorithm separately (b). For all methods involving
a training phase, we plot the average performance along with uncertainty
bars, showing the maximum and minimum values obtained. AUC values are
normalized to the considered interval.
For this reason in the future we are going to extend our
research in several directions including: considering spatial
information in the fusion process, fusion of forensic tools
explicitly thought to cope with counter-forensics, evaluation
of the performance of the fusion process on large realistic
datasets, comparison of the Dempster-Shafer framework with
other reasoning approaches, including fuzzy theory, Bayesian
inference, imprecise probability.
APPENDIX
In the following, the formal derivation behind the belief
discounting principle is given. We assume that the reliability
of ToolA is known through R. We introduce a new variable a,
with frame: 
a = fra; uag where ra is the proposition “ToolA
is reliable” and ua is the proposition “ToolA in unreliable”.
In our framework we model information about reliability by
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Fig. 7. Results on the realistic test dataset both using the decision fusion
methods (a) and each algorithm separately (b). Curves and AUC values have
the same meaning of those in Figure 6.
using a BBA that has only two focal elements:
m
aA (X) =
(
AR for X = f(ra)g
1 AR for X = f(ua)g
This BBA does not assign a mass to doubt: we are saying that
knowing that a tool is unreliable and ignoring whether it is
reliable or not are considered in the same way. Consequently,
the most intuitive mapping from R to this BBA assignment is
to choose AR = R.
Being defined on different frames, mA and m

a
A cannot
be combined directly. We need to extend them to a common
domain: the simplest one is 
a, which contains proposi-
tions on both ToolA response and reliability. We use vacuous
extension to find m
a"
aA :
m
a"
aA =
n
AR for X= f(t, ra) [ (n, ra)g
1 AR for X= f(t, ua) [ (n, ua)g
(10)
while, for extending mA to m

a
A , we use a different
approach, to give a specific interpretation of what tool reli-
ability should mean: we assume that if a tool is unreliable,
its detection should not modify beliefs when is fused. This
can be easily expressed by putting all elements representing
propositions in which the tool is not reliable (i.e. all (, ua)
elements) in every focal element of the combined BBA:
m"
aA (X) =
(
AT for X= f(t, ra) [ (t, ua) [ (n, ua)g
AN for X= f(n, ra) [ (t, ua) [ (n, ua)g
ATN for X= f(t, ra) [ (n, ra) [ (t, ua) [ (n, ua)g
(11)
Now, using the combination rule (section II-B) we can
combine BBAs in (10) and (11) to yield m
aAtot , which
summarizes all the knowledge we have about ToolA:
m
aAtot (X) =
8<:
ARAT for X= f(t, ra)g
ARAN for X= f(n, ra)g
ARATN for X= f(t, ra) [ (n, ra)g
1 AR for X= f(t, ua) [ (n, ua)g
Notice that in the above formula there is no conflict (K = 0).
This agrees with the intuition that information about the
reliability of a tool cannot be conflicting with information
about its output.
If we are only interested in taking decisions on the presence
or absence of traces (as it is in our case) it is useless to
keep trace of variable a, because it does not bring any direct
information about traces. Therefore, we choose to marginalize
m
aA with respect to this variable, yielding:
mAtot(X)

a# =
(
ARAT for X= f(t)g
ARAN for X= f(n)g
CA for X= f(t) [ (n)g
(12)
where CA = (1 AR(AT +AN )).
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